So this blog entry came about as a result of reading this article and some of the comments. It made me think about the conceptual problems I've been having in relation to Libertarianism's reliance on the concept of "self-ownership." This particular article allowed me to analyze it in terms of a third party, that of animals.
What follows is the news story, and then below it my lengthy lunchtime analysis. Also, don't mistake this analysis or my conclusion to mean I would support any animals rights groups, as their methods often are conflicting with other fundamental principles that are of equal concern and consideration.
"WASHINGTON CITY, Utah – Police in Washington City, have identified the person responsible for shooting a cat last week.
Police have identified a teenage boy from the area as the person responsible for shooting a cat, said Ed Kantor with Washington City Public Safety Wednesday.
Feb. 5, animal services took a cat that had been shot with an arrow in the nasal area and through its back. The arrow was removed and the cat is recovering.
Sufficient information was provided by someone in the community and led to identifying the teen, Kantor said
"It is a good thing for the community to address these issues and I feel it was very successful this time," Kantor said.
A motive has not been identified at this time, Kantor said. The case has been referred to the juvenile court.
Read more at http://www.ksl.com/?nid=148&sid=28706209#rTfg6fvs7yzZsmSG.99"
After reading this article, I started to wonder how a Libertarian might work through the issues involved here, specifically, property rights, non-coercion, and theories of harm, in relation to so-called “animal rights.”
While there are different strains of Libertarian thought, it would seem that the prevailing view, based on the assumptions of “self-ownership” would suggest that animals too are nothing more than “property.” Self-ownership itself, however, as a theoretical assumption has at least one major flaw wherein its claims regarding property rights as stemming from the logical sequence of self-ownership to (that self’s improvement of unorganized or unowned material by action into productive use establishes ownership in the improved material) is ultimately incoherent. For this logical rendering to be applied, the assumptions about the “self” must also be explained in terms of unorganized or unowned or unimproved material (elemental material). This assumption requires the “self” to be of the same type of material as all other kinds of elemental material wherein property rights may be established through productive improvement. That is to say that the human “self” (whatever that constitutes beforehand) must be the same type of property in all of its particulars as for example the house that I labor to build. The problem with this assumption is that the human self, self-evidently, cannot be unassumingly equated with raw inanimate material generally. While the human self is obviously made of up elemental material, that is not to say that everything that constitutes the human self, is solely material in the sense of meaningless elemental material operated upon by random external forces. If this were the case then there would be no possibility for human action, will, or thought independent of the coercive force of external stimuli. More simply stated humans in this conception must therefore be like the rock that is operated upon by gravity when it tumbles down a hill. In witnessing that event we do not think, “oh the rock chose to fall down the hill,” as that would imply that the rock had free-will, volition, or agency. This, given, our understanding of the laws of physics and the atomic makeup of elemental material would be patently absurd. However, this is the very type of logical premise from which self-ownership must derive. The “self” then would be constituted of the “owner” and the “owned.” Philosophical inquiry has struggled with this problem for centuries and has named this particular issue the subject-object dilemma. Normally, how this problem is demonstrated is in comparing the owner with the owned. In relation to human nature we would therefore say that the “owner” of our selves is our “soul,” or “spirit.” Generally, this aspect of ourselves would be, self-evidently, as well as axiomatically, regarded as “free,” from in relation to a myriad of physical and intellectual constraints. That is to say that we are free to choose, to do, or to be, in a way that a rock is not. Often this particular conception of free-will has its basis in religious theories of human origins wherein man has descended from Adam who had his spirit or soul breathed into his material body and in which he was made free. Regardless of the theoretical founding of this state, it is self-evident that humans are free to choose to do otherwise than nature or environment intends even though both often do play a part either in fashioning the limits and possibilities available. Ultimately, the assumption is that man is free in the sense that he has no constraints upon his consciousness, he is free to think, to feel, to act, and do what he wills, that to do so is in his self-evident and primordial capacity.
The other aspect of the “self” would therefore be that part of the self that is controlled by deterministic, biological, instinctive, or other lawful systems of order. That is, that our bodies are in some sense made of elemental material, such that it, like the rock, is subject to the laws of gravity. This is often manifested in certain ways that implicate genetics, physics, chemistry, and biology. However, as mentioned before fundamentally we differ in relation to our consciousness, volitional capacities and capabilities. The major problem comes in trying to justify, explain, or understand human nature or behavior in terms of this dualistic split. That is, how do two properties of human nature that are so fundamentally at odds interact with each other in a way that does not subject one to its opposite’s dominion or control. Science for the most part has been unable to explain this without just assuming (without scientific proof) that somehow free will exists in a way that differs from biological determinisms seemingly overarching dominion. Science, and particularly, psychological theory has demonstrated this particular shortcoming in relegating all human action to either basis in “nature” or “nurture.” In both situations it is the external deterministic processes which give causational rise to all human action, whether by genetic, chemical, or conditioned stimuli response mechanisms (which ultimately devolve to cognitive functions). That is to say that at its base human nature is only experienced as theoretically free but not actually free. This presents a problem to anyone who espouses a belief system that a priori assumes and requires freedom, agency, and moral responsibility. In the former these three cannot exist but only as secondary phenomena, that is to say that “freedom” cannot arise from “non-freedom.” A rock cannot become “free” because it is fundamentally “unfree.” I might say to the rock tumbling down the hill, “oh look, that rock chose to fall down the hill, it is free to do so,” but this would not change the fact that the rock is not free to choose to do so just because I’ve used language to describe it as so. Either we as humans are “free,” or we are not, and any freedom that arises if we are not, can only be regarded as a relative perception but never as a factual state of being.
However, to be completely consistent with its logical premises regarding human nature the theory of self-ownership must draw this dualistic distinction, because the owner (the soul) must own the owned (the body). This is the only way that property rights in “things” which are fundamentally the same as the” thing” known as the “body” can be established with logical consistency. In LDS theology this notion of ownership appears to be erroneous in the sense that humans are considered stewards rather than self-owners. Numerous scriptural citations and prophetic statements support this position but suffice it to say that it is the only conception of human nature that can avoid the dualistic problems mentioned above. LDS theology seemingly regards the human self, at this juncture, as an inseparably connected union of an elemental and spiritual self. While this may sound like the dualistic conception above there is a major difference in regard to how LDS understand the elemental nature of matter. First, LDS theology regards that which is termed “spirit” as matter, using in fact the same word in relation to its description of elemental. Both constitute a form of “matter” without a direct or express distinction. Joseph Smith taught that “spirit matter” is more refined than elemental matter and is therefore “invisible” to our perceptions until we also become more “refined.” He stated that once we have become refined we will see that spirit is matter, logically in the same way that the elements are matter. This conception of human nature is revolutionary in relation to modern science as it provides for the potentiality of a “god particle” at the heart of all existence. That is that there would be a form of matter that constitutes both the soul and the body allowing a union that is not fundamentally at odds with the other based on their similarity, eternality, and fundamental compatibility.
Regardless of the theoretical complexities of such a proposition, it is self-evident to all that humans are “free” and that we operate in a way that is not detached or deterministic in the way the dualistic rendering of man in self-ownership requires. That is to say that we experience ourselves as free and do not need to do this thought exercise to demonstrate it. However, the purpose of the thought exercise is not to prove that we are in fact free, it is to show the limitations of theories that we often subscribe to without further inquiry into their premises or the assumptions that must necessarily support its policies, conclusions, or tenants. Further the purpose is also to show how easy and how often we would rather cling to the dogmatic logical conclusions of such premises than actually reason them out and discard the inconsistent, the incoherent, and the apparently false. Also, often we would rather attempt to harmonize such tenants with plain language scriptural meanings without understanding the distinctions, the differences, and the conflicts inherent in the conflation, equation, or reinterpretation of the standard language. Too often we would much rather bring in wholesale a principle from some philosophy and equate it with LDS theology. Usually the only way that such falsehoods remain undetected is because they are given preferential status and are not contextually tempered by equally important and bedrock doctrinal considerations.
Now, finally after that lengthy preface, I’ll finally get to the issue the spurred my inquiry. The article above dealt with issues that implicate the “rights of animals.” A strict libertarian view and in the vein described above would necessitate describing animals (even to the extent that they are like humans) as simply “property.” How anything, under the theoretical tenants necessary for logical consistency, could be other than property in the sense that both humans and things are (they are both elemental) is hard to justify. If animals aren’t property in this sense, and humans are (according to the self-ownership principle), then what are they? There might be some sophistic hamming at this point in trying to describe different levels of property they would be at odds with the concept of self-ownership and the moral rules of governance that follow from it. Animals clearly aren’t rocks, but neither are they humans, and reasonably their nature must settle somewhere in between the two. Clearly, animals have a level or type of volition and consciousness that is unlike any other inanimate object, but yet is not as extensive as humans, or rather is of a different character. In that regard what moral rule is applied to animals in terms of the conceptions of rights deriving from and in rights of property? One prominent libertarian dealing with this issue, in order to remain consistent with the dualistic nature of property rights, stated that animals have no more rights than a pencil does, affirming the materialistic assumptions underlying such a conception of property rights. In this sense then, government would not have moral authority to regulate, impose, or intervene on behalf of animals, nor could they have any “rights” as generally understood. Other Libertarian views would constitute animals in terms of property ownership of a specific person. In this conception, only animals that could be found by some standard to be “owned” by a human could be considered to have “rights.” The non-aggression principle would then apply not to the animal but to the owner of the animal. A government would be allowed to intervene only where a bonafide “owned” animal was used not in accordance with its title which resides in the owner. However, the animal would not be the one considered to be harmed in this regard, it would be the owner’s harm that would be the sole measuring stick of restitution, retribution, punishment, or otherwise in that judicial system. This ultimately devolves into a discussion about what constitutes “harm” and while there are several strains of libertarian thought in relation to what constitutes harm, it would usually devolve into some utilitarian economic consideration, like for example, a cow that was stolen, or hurt, would be valued at a market cost and the loss of that value would be the measure of the harm. However, why “economic principles” should govern in this instance anyway is nothing more than an assumed preference but logically necessary conclusion for most Libertarians given the prior necessary assumption that all “things” are “property” and that all “rights” are therefore property rights. Ultimately, this analysis only tells us what we’ve assumed, that animals are just property, like the house, the corn, the rock, and ultimately if taken to its logical conclusion, the person. Why this logical rendering can’t therefore be applied to humans is a theoretical slippery-slope that I won’t address right now, but is one that can be and arguably is the theoretical and practical implicative end of such an assumed worldview.
I contrasted this particular worldview in relation to LDS theology regarding animal rights and found some interesting things that I think are worth consideration. There were several important issues in the entry for Animals in the Encyclopedia of Mormonism but I wanted to dwell on a few that implicate the libertarian concerns above. First, D&C 59:16-20 provides that animals, like other “good things which come of the earth…are made for the benefit and the use of man,” but are “to be used, with judgment, not to excess, neither by extortion.” The interesting word usage I focused on in this passage is that of “extortion.” This particular word denotes financial or economic exploitation or other general criminality. In criminal law extortion is defined as, “[t]he act or practice of obtaining something or compelling some action by illegal means, as by force or coercion,” or “collection of an unlawful fee.” I think this statement is interesting in that it denotes not just some unlawful force but also relates to the possibility of economic exploitation of animals. That is not to say that the market could never recognize an objectively based value for an animal that comes under its theory of ownership, but to the extent that animals are simply nothing more than property of the kind described above, then the same justifications that were used to sell slaves is equally applicable. However, I am m not saying that animals are akin to or are or should be valued the same as humans, just that slaves were once considered rightful objects of property and their economic valuation (wrongful as it was and ever will be) was justified by that status. Additionally, in relation to other LDS doctrines regarding the pre-existent and eternal (saved) status of animals it should be incredibly hard to justify the value of animals on the basis of a utilitarian market based valuation system, whatever their ultimate value is, and whether that in any instance can be quantified in monetary terms. Whatever the case LDS theology recognizes their eternal place, in all eras of life, logically, before this life, during it, and after this particular one, and during the millennium when they will share this world with us as was taught by Joseph Smith.
The next passage that intrigued me was the reference to dominion and its proper limits, which states, “God gave Adam and Even dominion over the animals (Gen. 1:28), but legitimate dominion is neither coercive nor exploitative (D&C 121:34-36).” The word that caught my interest in this passage is “coercive.” “Coercion” is the Libertarian buzzword for overreaching governmental intrusion. Coercion in the context of human action and from a Libertarian perspective requires several assumptions about the nature of man. These include his volitional capacities, his ability to reason, and his competency to contract. Forms of government that are therefore considered “coercive” are those that do not obtain consent for representative action, those that interfere with legitimate and voluntarily entered into contracts, or those that “force” morals through legislation. There are a number of things wrong with the latter conception of force as posited by most Libertarians as that conception of “force” presumes a number of things about what the metaphysical status of morality, about its universal applicability, and the propriety of the imposition of rule under compactual consent (to name a few). In this conception of coercion all actions that establish any and all guidelines for “rightful” actions, or that define either cultural or universal norms are considered “forceful” and “coercive” upon the human mind body, and/or soul (usually a Libertarian hasn’t justified his theory of self), which it must be assumed is not subject to any constraints whether intellectual, actual, or physical. Such a conception stretches beyond the realm of reason the actual capacities of man while at the same time fundamentally altering the narrative supporting his actual origins (often disregarded by circular resort to “coercion”). To maintain this definition of force at its base there must be no actual truth, nor any epistemological foundation for achieving certainty with regard to it. Such an assumption only exists when presumed and ultimately destroys the very “value” (a moral consideration) that is to be had in the supposed “moral” rule of “non-aggression.” Thus, aggression may be defined relatively (as it often is by different strains of Libertarian thought) or defense of a particular definition must ultimately be resorted to in terms of presupposed utilitarian or pragmatic notions of harm. This assumes without proof that there are not objective bases for “harms” that arise in human action as a condition of our existence that are either done by omission or commission and not just in relation to property violations.
In the context of animal rights, “harm” and “coercive” conditions must be defined and as I’ve shown they cannot be done so on a universal basis under the conception of animals as merely property. Further, this argument would extend to wild animals in the sense that they have no designated owner in the sense of Libertarians casting of all rights in the form of property rights. Whose property would the wild animals be? Either they aren’t property in the sense of owned property, or if they are afforded any property rights they cannot have any in the sense that humans do, as they do not understand what constitutes coercion, have similar capacities in relation to consent, and contract. A wild cat would not know it is trespassing on your property and would therefore not know it is being “coercive,” or that it is “aggressing” against your property, nor could it know such a thing. This basis is the basis upon which humans are judged under the non-aggression principle. They are assumed to have the capacity to understand and respect property rights the same cannot be said of animals and therefore all animals must be property in the strict sense if they are afforded status at all. As described above there is no objective moral foundation to support any conception of their treatment except under monetary terms.
However, in LDS theology the concept that generally applies in relation to animals is “stewardship” under the dominion that God instituted. This dominion is limited in general ways mentioned above but also in specific ways including; (1) not to waste; (2) meat to be used for saving lives but not for sport or bloodshed; (3) and use that is not “neglectful.” This alone suggests that animals have “rights” in a sense that does not comport with self-ownership property rights. If an animal has a right not to be neglected by its owner or rather, its steward, then it must also have an objective basis for enforcing that right. How that is established in a judicial system is another question but it should be noted that certain “rights” for animals do exist outside of strict property ownership theories. According to the Encyclopedia of Mormonism several LDS leaders strongly criticized destroying animal life merely for sport, including Lorenzo Snow, Joseph F. Smith, Joseph Fielding Smith, and Spencer W. Kimball. Lorenzo Snow called it a “murderous amusement.” This comports with the notion that animals also have the right to Life (lite) which would imply proper limits on their “owners,” or fellow “stewards.”
Perhaps their right to life would be considered under the international legal doctrine of right of occupancy. Because the animals occupy the land but do not improve it in any sense they only have a right of occupancy. This same right of occupancy could easily apply to humans as well under a stewardship theory of property rights. It is argued that humans are stewards of their own bodies, that they have the right of possession of their bodies, but that ultimate title and ownership rests with God. In that sense then humans would not have the “right” to do anything with their bodies that they please. This does not mean however that their freedom to do whatever they want with their bodies has been taken away. This conception of rights and liberty is often a misconception and misconstrual of the distinctive differences between what actually constitutes “force,” “freedom,” and “liberty.” People often confuse freedom with liberty and in doing so refashion liberty into nothing more than license. Rather freedom has more to do with the fundamental nature of man, in that he is free to think and free to do. A law that is in place, for example to illegalize murder (simultaneously defining it), does not deprive the individual person the ability or freedom to commit murder. Nor does it mean that once that individual goes to prison for the murder that he has lost all freedom. While he may not be free to do certain things his freedom to think remains intact. In relation to God’s plan he is still capable of choosing to follow God’s laws and to change his life within the probationary state he is placed. What he has really lost is his liberty. His liberty has been constrained due to this violation of another person’s God-given right to life, which society also has a direct interest in, in defining what is lawful. Thus, it is shown that liberty and freedom have overlapping components but they are not the same and that laws do not deprive a person of freedom. In this sense then animals could be considered to have similar stewardship property rights to humans. They may have a “right” to the food that they hunt and kill to support their own lives. Such a right would not and could not be subsumed under a strict libertarian view of property rights as I’ve explained above.
All these instances in my opinion point to the fact that animals are not property in the common libertarian conception. In that same sense it should be readily apparent that if animals are not property in that sense then humans cannot be property in the same sense that self-ownership implies at least under a conception of LDS theology consistent with its doctrine regarding agency.
Finally, a statement and example given by Joseph Smith highlights the dispositional nature of both men and animals as something that is similar and rooted their simultaneous connection to God. The Encyclopedia states:
When the Prophet Joseph Smith saw his associates about to kill three rattlesnakes at their campsite, he said, "Let them alone-don't hurt them! How will the serpent ever lose its venom, while the servants of God possess the same disposition, and continue to make war upon it? Men must become harmless before the brute creation, and when men lose their vicious dispositions and cease to destroy the animal race, the lion and the lamb can dwell together, and the sucking child can play with the serpent in safety" (TPJS, p. 71).
This passage is incredibly interesting given the usage of the words “disposition,” and “harmless.” What Joseph seems to be implying at least partially and in my opinion is that on some level animals (even snakes, gross) have similar dispositions as humans this arguably is in relation to their spiritual and elemental natures, as well as their purposes in relation to God’s plan (which covers everything). Further, his usage of the word “harmless” apparently applies both to animals and men, that is, that both men and animals can become “harmless,” to each other. The fact that Joseph emphasized it in that moment and not in some prophetic futurity suggests that such a future state necessitates present dispositional change. He wasn’t saying that one day out of the blue and in no relation to man’s stewardship animals will live with us in peace. Rather, what is implied is that when man’s disposition changes so too will the animal’s dispositions. The fact that Joseph made no exception for the arguably most mythically evil regarded animal is quite extraordinary. President Heber C. Kimball took the argument to its fullest extent and said that “[Horses] have the same life in them that you have, and we should not hurt them.” Thus, it should be obvious that animals in LDS theology are something infinitely more than “property” as they have the same life as us, also implying that humans are also fundamentally more than “property.” This is not even qualified in the sense of it being the same “type” of life, or even any sense of a “lesser” life. While they may be of a different sphere of creation, the same underlying eternal matter inherent in human life is present and primary in animal life in LDS theology. Discussion of “animal rights,” must therefore be cognizant of these concerns and any claims that disregard this fundamental description of reality must be prepared to justify their violation of the lawful and natural responsibilities that derive from eternal legal recognition of the true value of all animal life.
